Public reporting burden for this collection of information is estimated to average 1 hour per response, including the time for reviewing instructions, searching existing data sources, gathering and maintaining the data needed, and completing and reviewing this collection of information. Send comments regarding this burden estimate or any other aspect of this collection of information, including suggestions for reducing this burden to Department of Defense, Washington Headquarters Services, Directorate for Information Operations and Reports (0704-0188), 1215 Jefferson Davis Highway, Suite 1204, Arlington, VA 22202-4302. Respondents should be aware that notwithstanding any other provision of law, no person shall be subject to any penalty for failing to comply with a collection of information if it does not display a currently valid OMB control number. PLEASE DO NOT RETURN YOUR FORM TO THE ABOVE ADDRESS.
U.S. Army War College 122 Forbes Avenue
Carlisle, PA 17013
SPONSOR/MONITOR'S REPORT NUMBER(S)

DISTRIBUTION / AVAILABILITY STATEMENT
Distribution A: Unlimited
SUPPLEMENTARY NOTES
The Future Combat Systems (FCS) was conceived in 1999 as a System of Systems whose separate parts would operate as a whole with an advanced network and move quickly with a minimal logistics tail to hostile environments. Its design focused on the high intensity conflict also known as Major Combat Operations. The Manned Ground Vehicle portion of the program was terminated by the Office of the Secretary of Defense in a June 2009 Acquisition Defense Memorandum because it was not the proper vehicle for the current environment. Following that decision, the Army's Training and Doctrine Command (TRADOC) developed a new Ground Combat Vehicle (GCV) requirement and wrote a new Capstone Concept. The vehicle envisioned is not part of a family of systems and it does not need to move quickly to hostile environments. The Army chose to focus the initial increment of the GCV on an Infantry Fighting Vehicle (IFV). This decision was driven by both the inability to upgrade current Army infantry platforms and the density of IFVs across the 24 heavy brigades programmed by the Army. The Army is now pursuing a platform replacement and upgrade strategy, rendering Shinseki's vision unachievable for the foreseeable future.
The Future Combat Systems (FCS) was conceived in 1999 as a System of Systems whose separate parts would operate as a whole with an advanced network and move quickly with a minimal logistics tail to hostile environments. Its design focused 
THE ARMY'S QUEST FOR A NEW GROUND COMBAT VEHICLE
To truly achieve victory as Clausewitz defined it-attaining a political objective-the US military's ability to kick down the door must be matched by its ability to clean up the mess and even rebuild the house afterward. acknowledged that an Army vehicle modernization program designed to meet the needs of the full spectrum of conflict was essential and recommended its relaunch.
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FCS was the materiel centerpiece of Army Transformation efforts. It consisted of 18 manned and unmanned systems tied together by a communications network. 4 The manned vehicles were intended to replace heavy platforms with lighter, more deployable, modular vehicles on a common chassis. 5 In addition, the systems included advanced sensors as well as robotic air and ground vehicles. 
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• Network Centric Architecture
The jointly funded program would create a system whose attributes were:
• Robotics integrated into the force Fielding would begin in 2012.
Each team was to develop two design concepts, both of which would provide deployability, agility, versatility, lethality, survivability and sustainability (the "ilities") for the objective force. The first design concept was for a for a network enabled distributed force that included a manned command and control personnel carrier, a robotic direct fire system, a robotic non-line-of-sight system, an all weather robotic sensor system and other layered sensors. The second concept was for the team's own approach to a system of systems. program. 44 They are the minimum attributes or characteristics considered most essential for an effective military capability. 45 The KPP that appeared to receive the most attention at the time was "Transportability" because it was thought to require the system to fit within a C-130 airframe. The KPP itself stated that the system must be transportable by air, sea, highway and rail to support inter-theater deployment as well as intra-theater operational maneuver. 46 KPPs are used during operational testing. The system must perform to the KPPs. While the Transportability KPP did not specify that the platform fit into a C130, a Band 2 ORD requirement did. However, this is not a requirement that the system has to meet to pass the operational test phase. In the FCS program, Band 2 ORD requirements required CSA approval to change. This requirement was going to change per the request of the TRADOC Commander to the CSA at the end of 2007.
The ability to move quickly to hot spots was critical to General Shinseki's vision of a more deployable Army. 47 The request was an adjustment of the threshold requirement from "intra-theater transportable on C-130/C-17 aircraft" to "on C-17 aircraft." 48 The day after the ORD was approved, on May 14, 2003, the Defense Acquisition Executive (DAE) approved the program's entry into the Milestone B, or the System Design and Demonstration (SDD) phase of development. 49 The SDD phase focuses on reducing integration and manufacturing risk, ensuring operational supportability, and demonstrating the system through prototypes or engineering development models. Congressional perception of the LSI was not favorable. There was concern over the LSI fee arrangement and a perceived lack of government control and oversight.
Secretary Gates saw the LSI fee as a "pass-through" to acquire the vehicles as opposed to buying them directly from a contractor as with the MRAP procurement. He also noted that the performance fee was guaranteed to the LSI at the critical design review (CDR) which determines whether the design of a system satisfies performance and engineering requirements. The General Accountability Office expressed this in a report to Congress. It stated that it was difficult to tie the contractor's performance to actual outcomes. It also criticized OSD for not providing sufficient oversight to the program. The program employed DoD's evolutionary acquisition model which allowed for upgrades through the spiral development process.
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As envisioned, FCS systems were connected by means of an advanced network architecture that would permit connectivity with other services, situational awareness and understanding, and synchronized operations.
The program deferred some requirements definition in order to use initial test data for clarification and refinement.
The refined requirements would then be part of the Capability Development Document required for Milestone C. GAO also objected to this type of weapons system development. The Army responded by moving toward a phased-development approach.
The Systems included:
• Unattended ground sensors (UGS);
• Non-Line-of-Sight Launch System (NLOS-LS) and Intelligent Munitions System (IMS);
• Four classes of unmanned aerial vehicles (UAVs) which were organic to platoon, company, battalion and other echelons;
• Three classes of unmanned ground vehicles (UGVs):
o the Armed Robotic Vehicle (ARV), o the Small Unmanned Ground Vehicle (SUGV), and the o Multifunctional Utility/Logistics and Equipment Vehicle (MULE);
• Eight types of manned ground vehicles;
• The network, and
• The individual soldier and his personal equipment and weapons. The Task Force's fundamental purpose was to accelerate the progression of FCS to production status and enable decision making by senior leadership of the Army.
Toward that end, the task force was given responsibility for establishing a team to resolve issues, operational and system design concepts and technology/requirements tradeoffs, seek assistance and better coordinate collaboration. 67 A lesser included mission of OFTF was to "sell" Transformation and FCS. The office was responsible for developing products to inform OSD, the Army and the Congress about the Army vision. It was responsible for the rhetoric stating "We will see them first, make the right decisions before they do, and decisively engage and destroy them first. In short, we will make every engagement an ambush." 68 The "see first, understand first, act first and finish decisively" phrase became associated with FCS in such a way that many believed that the system would provide the Soldier the ability to do this with little exercise of judgment on his or her part. The 1994 Concept states that it is not doctrine, but rather a document of ideas for it is ideas that lead change for the Army.
• Shaping and Entry addressed the regional condition setting, and shaping the battlespace
• Operational Maneuver over Strategic Distances enables the force to deter or promptly engage an enemy from positions of advantage.
• Intratheater Operational Maneuver is the ability to extend the reach of the joint force commander
• Decisive Maneuver is the need for a lethal combined arms force.
• The concept, while looking toward the future environment, also recognized issues relevant to current operations in Iraq and Afghanistan by stating the need for knowledge "also encompasses understanding and appreciation of the cultural, ethnic, political, tribal, religious and ideological factors influencing the behavior of enemies, allies and neutrals." 74 Further, it recognized that in the unconventional and stability environments, cultural and social elements of situational understanding would be more significant and require human rather than technical resources. 75 It did not assume the perfect situational understanding that some of the hyperbole associated with FCS did.
Rather, it stated that information superiority would be a contest, not "an advantage to be taken for granted." The central idea of operational adaptability is described as quality Army leaders and forces exhibit based on critical thinking, comfort with ambiguity and decentralization, willingness to accept prudent risk and an ability to rapidly adjust. 80 It encourages forces to develop situations through action based on the fact that technology cannot deliver everything that forces and leaders must learn. 81 The last portion of the most recent concept discusses core operational actions the Future Army must conduct. They are:
This is an overstatement. Nothing in doctrine suggests that technology will deliver cognitive skills.
• Conduct security force assistance • Network enabled mission command
Absent from this concept is the need for operational maneuver from strategic distances which was the main ambition of General Shinseki's vision. The idea was that in moving an Army to global emergencies, speed was vital. Lighter platforms would enable this speed because they could move more quickly through strategic air or sea lift. In addition, they would take less time to repackage and reassemble. This may be a result of the recent experience of current leaders who after nine years in contact in
Counterinsurgency Operations (COIN) did not have to worry about how their assets and supply chain got to them because they were already there.
-taking advantage of network capabilities while ensuring forces and leaders conduct operations with the concept of mission command.
In the absence of an overarching vision of the future and with new concept that has doctrine for practical application now, the Army is headed for a modest heavy force and platform replacement and not a strategically mobile or innovative future force.
Army Modernization Today
The Army of the future is getting heavier, adding more age and weight to existing platforms rather than transforming to a newer, lighter and more deployable force. It is doing so without a strategic vision, but rather with an image of persistent conflict.
General George Casey said recently, "[s]uffice it to say, our view of the environment has not significantly changed, and it's persistent conflict." 82 General Casey described an operational environment as one of persistent conflict for the next decade, where the United States would continue to be enmeshed in a long-term ideological struggle with global extremist terrorist networks. As well, international trends were "more likely to exacerbate rather than ameliorate" the problems. Global trends included globalization and the proliferation of technology. 83 The systems harvested from the FCS program: robots, sensors, NLOS-LS and the network capabilities will assist in countering this type of threat. Another benefit from the FCS program was generated by the FCS Organizational and Operational Plan (O&O) which provided the operational concept for the unmanned and unmanned teaming employed in Iraq by Task Force ODIN, an aviation battalion, chartered specifically to counter IEDs. 84 These technologies were only in their infancy ten years ago; now they seem routine. There are five different vendors producing some 32 variants MRAP vehicles which create significant logistics issues. 87 Key components of the vehicles such as transmissions and engines are different for each variant. In addition, the MRAP is not expeditionary because of the logistics requirements and shipboard and air transportability issues. 88 In Afghanistan, the MRAP purchased for Iraq is too top-heavy so an All-Terrain variant is required.
In Afghanistan, the Marines are experiencing great success with a version of the "Grizzly" breacher program, cancelled by the Army, to push through barriers and booby traps. 89 The Marines continued their version of the program with discretionary funds.
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The Stryker, intended by General Shinseki to be an "off-the-shelf" system that would not be part of the transformed Army is now undergoing upgrades as a permanent system.
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The Paladin howitzer built in the early 1960s, was expected to be replaced by the Crusader (cancelled), and then the NLOS-C (cancelled), is now getting an upgrade so it can last until 2050.
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The Abrams tank is getting upgrades and the future Army will have two variants of the system, the M1A1 Situational Awareness (SA) and the M1A2 (System Enhancement Program (SEP) v2.
This, plus the Lightweight 155 cannon comprise the Army's ability to conduct suppressive fires. 93 Resetting an Abrams to zero miles zero hours, without upgrades, costs approximately $3.3 million dollars. Upgrading it to the latest version is $5.2 million dollars. 94 The Army is developing a new Ground Combat Vehicle (GCV) to replace its two infantry carriers, the M113 and the Bradley Fighting Vehicle. The new platform's deign will have the under-belly protection of the MRAP, the off-road mobility of a Bradley and the urban and operational mobility of a Stryker. 95 It will have sufficient growth potential to ensure integration of upgrades and new technologies. 96 The first vehicle is expected by FY 17. 97 The vehicle is expected to weigh between 35 and 40 tons. 98 The Army for the foreseeable future is heavier and just as logistically burdened as the one that had such trouble moving to contact in the 1990s. In 1999, General
Shinseki established mobility goals with a plan to achieve them. The latest version of the Army Campaign Plan retains those mobility goals. Annex T states that the Army will deploy and employ a modular brigade in four days, three modular brigades and a division headquarters in ten days, nine modular brigades with a division headquarters within 20 days, and fifteen modular brigades in 30 days. 99 The difference is the Army has no plan to achieve them. In fact, the Army's current modernization efforts make those goals harder to attain than they were in 1999. Gates said "the FCS vehicle program was, despite some adjustments, designed using the same basic assumptions as when FCS was first designed nine years ago. The premise behind the design of these vehicles was that lower weight, greater fuel efficiency, and, above all, near-total situational awareness, would compensate for less heavy armor -a premise that I believe was belied by the close-quarters combat, urban warfare, and increasingly lethal forms of ambush that we've seen in both Iraq and Afghanistan, and are likely to see elsewhere as other adversaries probe for and find ways to turn our strengths against us." 14 Ibid. 15 Ibid. 16 Ibid., 6. Secretary Gates published a similar article in Foreign Affairs. In that article he said, that "[w]hen it comes to procurement, for the better part of five decades, the trend has gone toward lower numbers as technology gains have made each system more capable. In recent years, these platforms have grown ever more baroque, have become ever more costly, are taking longer to build, and are being fielded in ever-dwindling quantities. Given that resources are not unlimited, the dynamic of exchanging numbers for capability is perhaps 18 Global Security.Org, Military, http://www.globalsecurity.org/military/systems/ground/m8-ags.htm; http://www.globalsecurity.org/military/systems/ground/fscs.htm; http://www.globalsecurity.org/military/systems/ground/grizzly.htm (accessed March 12, 2010). In the fiscal 1996 budget the Armored Gun System was slated to enter production. The Army's Armored Gun System was terminated in 1996, and the FY 97 budget abandoned the Armored Gun System program; FSCS was a joint development program between the US and the UK. The combined/harmonized draft ORD was approved in January 1998. A 07 July 1998 Memorandum of Understanding (MOU) between the United States and the United Kingdom established the US Future Scout and Cavalry System (FSCS) / UK Tactical Reconnaissance Armoured Combat Equipment Requirement (TRACER) program. The program was cancelled in order to pay for the FCS program; the GRIZZLY [initially designated the Breacher] was an armored vehicle designed to breach complex obstacles including mines, berms, wire, rubble, and tank-ditches. The GRIZZLY would breach obstacles with minimal preparation creating safe lanes for other vehicles in the dominant maneuver force with little or no loss in momentum. The GRIZZLY's obstacle clearing features include a full-width mine-clearing blade and a powered, extensible excavating arm. 19 Ibid. The Fiscal Year 2001 Army budget request included decisions to restructure or "divest" a number of programs in order to provide some of the resources to support its transformation to achieve the ambitious deployment goals outlined in the October 1999 Army Vision. The restructured programs were the Crusader and the Future Scout and Cavalry System. The "divestitures" included Stinger Block II, Command and Control Vehicle (C2V), Grizzly, Wolverine, and the Army Tactical Missile System Block IIA. Funding for these programs was reallocated to fund the Army Vision transformation strategy. Reportedly, the Army deployed a unit consisting of units from different divisions that had never trained together commanded by a command and control organization that was unable to conduct joint operations. The most often cited criticism was that it took more than 30 days to deploy TF Hawk, centered on 28 Apache attack helicopters, from bases in Germany to Albania; and, when they finally arrived, they were unable to conduct combat operations due to training and equipment deficiencies. The task force also consisted of mechanized maneuver and support elements competing for limited air lift insertion capabilities. 
